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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Michael Grantham, the primary physical custodian of his 
two children pursuant to a decree of dissolution, was called to active 
duty with the Iowa National Guard, he arranged for his children to 
reside with his mother.1  The children’s mother then filed a petition 
seeking permanent physical care of the children and temporary 
custody of the children pendente lite2 while Michael was away for 
service.3  Michael requested a stay of the custody proceedings under 
the applicable law until he returned to civilian status, but the Iowa 
District Court for Butler County denied the request.4  Ultimately, with 
Michael in attendance, the district court ruled that permanent 
physical care of the children should be changed from Michael to his 
ex-wife.5  The court of appeals reversed and emphasized how “[a]s a 
result of the judgment of the district court, a soldier, who answered 
our Nations [sic] call to defend, lost physical care of his children 
because he was ‘obliged to drop [his] own affairs to take up the 
burdens of the nation.’”6  The Iowa Supreme Court reinstated the 
district court’s ruling, however, agreeing that circumstances had 
significantly changed since the entry of the dissolution decree and 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2014; B.S., summa cum laude, 
Boston University, 2009.  Thank you to Professor Solangel Maldonado for her 
invaluable guidance and inspiration.  I would also like to thank Erik Schwind for his 
constant encouragement and support.  
 1  In re Marriage of Grantham, 698 N.W.2d 140, 142–43 (Iowa 2005).  
 2  Pendente lite is a Latin term for “while the action is pending.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1248 (9th ed. 2009).  
 3  Grantham, 698 N.W.2d at 143. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  In re Marriage of Grantham, No. 4-468, 2004 Iowa App. LEXIS 1257, at *33 
(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2004), vacated by In re Marriage of Grantham, 698 N.W.2d 140 
(Iowa 2005). 
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the children’s mother was presently the most effective parent to both 
children.7 
In February 2003, Eva Crouch, a member of the Kentucky 
National Guard, was ordered to report to active federal duty within 
seventy-two hours.8  In this short time frame, she made arrangements 
to transfer physical custody of her child to her ex-husband for the 
duration of her active deployment—an arrangement that both parties 
intended to be temporary.9  The ex-husband’s attorney drafted an 
order to memorialize these intentions, and the order was entered at 
the state trial court.10  Eva was then mobilized and deployed to Fort 
Knox, Kentucky for one year.11  In 2004, she contacted her ex-
husband to arrange for reassuming physical custody of their child.12  
Her ex-husband, however, refused to transfer physical custody 
without a court order.13  At trial, the court instead entered an order 
finding that it was in the child’s best interests to remain with the 
father.14  After two years of litigation and about $25,000 in legal fees,15 
Eva ultimately prevailed in her custody battle when the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky held that the order made prior to Eva Crouch’s 
deployment was temporary and, therefore, not a modification of the 
original permanent custody order.16  In a subsequent comment to the 
media, Eva said, “I’d have spent a million [dollars].  My child was my 
life . . . I go serve my country, and I come back and have to go 
through hell and high water.”17 
These cases, along with several other stories documented in the 
news in recent years,18 portray how child custody disputes involving 
 
 7  In re Marriage of Grantham, 698 N.W.2d at 146–47.   
 8  Crouch v. Crouch, 201 S.W.3d 463, 464 (Ky. 2006). 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id.  
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Crouch, 201 S.W.3d at 464.   
 15  Deployed Troops Fight for Lost Custody of Kids, NBCNEWS.COM (May 5, 2007), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18506417/. 
 16  Crouch, 201 S.W.3d at 466.  The Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld the court 
of appeal’s determination.  Id. at 464–65.  
 17  Deployed Troops Fight for Lost Custody of Kids, supra note 15. 
 18  See id.; see also Michelle Miller, Military Parents Fight for Custody at Home, 
CBSNEWS.COM (Dec. 12, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18563_162-
5972251.html; David Kocieniewski, Soldier’s Service Leads to a Custody Battle at Home, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01
/nyregion/01guard.html?pagewanted=all; Ann Scott Tyson, Deployment Being Used 
Against Parents in Child Custody Battles, THE WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2008), 
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members of the military service can become unpleasant and costly by-
products of active military duty.  Since October 2001, there have been 
unprecedented levels of deployment and increased reliance on 
Reserve and Guard members.19  With the United States’ ongoing 
involvement in conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the inadequacies of 
legal protections for military servicemembers who are single and 
divorced, many of whom maintained physical custody of their 
children prior to deployment, have come to the forefront of 
discussion and political debate.20  While some sources have drawn 
attention to the stories of servicemember-mothers involved in custody 
battles as a result of military deployment,21 the problem is one that 
transcends gender lines.  In effect, “single parents in uniform fight a 
war on two fronts: For the nation they are sworn to defend, and for 
the children they are losing because of that duty.”22 
The federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”) provides 
procedural protections for servicemembers, such as staying child 
custody proceedings for at least ninety days if the active-duty 
servicemember meets particular conditions,23 but it does not address 
the impact that a servicemember’s deployment may have on future 
custody determinations.  In the past several years, many states have 
implemented laws designed to protect servicemembers in child 
custody and visitation cases, but these laws are not consistent across 
the country.24  In July 2012, the Uniform Law Commission25 (“ULC”) 
 
http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/29/AR2008122902611.html.  
 19  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF DEPLOYMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE 
ARMED FORCES ON THEIR DEPENDENT CHILDREN 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/Report_to_Congress_on_I
mpact_of_Deployment_on_Military_Children.pdf. 
 20  Senators Still Skeptical of Federal Child Custody Protections, AIR FORCE TIMES (June 
25, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 14268077.  
 21  Rachelle L. Paquin, Note, Defining the “Fit”: The Impact of Gender and 
Servicemember Status on Child Custody Determinations, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 533, 
574–75 (2011). 
 22  Deployed Troops Fight for Lost Custody of Kids, supra note 15. 
 23  See generally Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 108–189, 177 Stat. 
2835 (2003) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–594 (2006)). 
 24  Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Deployed%20Parents%20Cust
ody%20and%20Visitation%20Act (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 25  The ULC is a group of practicing lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative 
staff, and law professors who have been appointed by state governments to research, 
draft, and promote enactment of uniform state laws.  About the ULC, UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2014).  
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granted final approval to the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and 
Visitation Act (“UDPCVA”), which all state legislatures could adopt to 
standardize custody rights for deployed servicemembers.26  Since 
2008, however, supporters of federal legislation have proposed that 
Congress should amend the SCRA to provide greater legal protection 
for servicemembers in child custody disputes.27 
Parts II and III of this Comment examine military policy 
regarding single-parent service and state-court efforts to address child 
custody issues for single-parent servicemembers.  Part IV describes 
the current SCRA and Congressman Michael Turner’s proposed 
amendments to the federal legislation. Part V analyzes the benefits 
and shortcomings of the ULC’s Uniform Deployed Parents Custody 
and Visitation Act.  Part VI argues that Congress should defer to the 
approach proposed by the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and 
Visitation Act, but that Congress should make funding for welfare 
contingent on states’ adoption of the uniform law in order to 
encourage its adoption in all states. 
II. BACKGROUND AND MILITARY POLICY REGARDING SINGLE-PARENT 
SERVICE 
In addressing military child custody matters, it is first necessary 
to consider the military’s underlying policies and regulations 
concerning single-parent service.  Department of Defense Instruction 
1304.26 provides in pertinent part: “The Military Services may not 
enlist married individuals with more than two dependents under the 
age of 18 or unmarried individuals with custody of any dependents 
under the age of 18.”28  The Air Force Recruiting Service has 
specifically emphasized that an unmarried applicant who has physical 
 
 26  Panel: Improve Child Custody Rules for Military, USATODAY.COM (July 18, 2012), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-07-18/military-child-
custody/56294984/1.  
 27  Letter from Michael R. Turner and Robert Andrews, Members of Congress, to 
Leon Panetta, U.S. Sec’y of Def. (Mar. 29, 2012), available at 
http://turner.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hasc_child_custody_letter_to_secretary_pan
etta_-_3-29-12.pdf; see also Senators Still Skeptical of Federal Child Custody Protections, supra 
note 20. 
 28  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1304.26, QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR 
ENLISTMENT, APPOINTMENT, AND INDUCTION 8 (2005), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130426p.pdf (emphasis added); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 601-210, ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENTS ENLISTMENT 
PROGRAM 11 (2011); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, MCO P1100.72C, MILITARY PERSONNEL 
PROCUREMENT MANUAL, VOLUME 2: ENLISTED PROCUREMENT 3-37 (2004); AIR FORCE 
RECRUITING SERVICE, INSTRUCTION 36-2001, RECRUITING PROCEDURES FOR THE AIR 
FORCE 49 (2012).  
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or legal custody of a family member incapable of self-care “does not 
have the flexibility required to perform worldwide duty, short-notice 
[temporary duty], remote tours, and varied duty hours.”29  As such, an 
applicant falling into this category is ineligible for enlistment unless 
permanent physical and legal custody has been transferred by court 
order.30 
Although this enlistment restriction exists across all branches of 
the armed services, married individuals who are already serving in the 
military sometimes become single parents, by way of divorce or death 
of spouse.  As of 2009, there were a total of 74,754 single-parent 
active-duty members in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force 
combined.31  There were 77,181 single parents serving in the Selected 
Reserves, which includes Guard components,32 Reserve components,33 
and the Coast Guard Reserve.34  According to 2010 data, single 
parents make up 17% of the servicemembers who deployed to 
Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom.35 
Considering the practical difficulties presented when military 
servicemembers are responsible for the care of dependents, the 
military has implemented ways to standardize the family care 
requirements for all of the military services.  Department of Defense 
Instruction Number 1342.19 provides that “[a]ll Service members . . . 
shall plan for contingencies in the care and support of dependent 
family members, and shall develop and submit a family care plan 
within the timeliness set forth in this Instruction.”36  The Army, for 
example, emphasizes how plans must be made “to ensure Family 
members are properly and adequately cared for when the Soldier is 
 
 29  AIR FORCE RECRUITING SERVICE, INSTRUCTION 36-2001, supra note 28. 
 30  Id. 
 31  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEMOGRAPHICS 2009: PROFILE OF THE MILITARY COMMUNITY 
64 (2009), available at http://www.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports
/2009_Demographics_Report.pdf. 
 32  Guard “components” include the Army National Guard and Air National 
Guard.  Id. at 128.  
 33  Reserve “components” include the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps 
Reserve, and Air Force Reserve.  Id.  
 34  Id.  
 35  REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF DEPLOYMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ON 
THEIR DEPENDENT CHILDREN, supra note 19, at 13.  Notably, the Department of 
Defense would likely never extend Instruction 1304.26 to cover servicemember 
parents who become single by divorce or death of a spouse because, along with 
conveying a severe lack of sensitivity, this measure would surely mean the actual loss 
of a considerable number of current servicemembers. 
 36  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1342.19, FAMILY CARE PLANS 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134219p.pdf. 
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deployed, on [temporary duty], or otherwise not available due to 
military requirements.”37  Despite the necessity of these plans for 
single military parents, the Family Care Plan (“FCP”), mandated 
under Instruction Number 1342.19, is not a legal document that can 
change a court-mandated custodial arrangement.38  The FCP’s “sole 
purpose” is to document for the military how soldiers plan to provide 
for the care of their family members when military duties call.39  The 
FCP must include proof that the servicemember has obtained 
consent to the planned designation of guardianship from all parties 
with a legal interest in the custody and care of the minor child, or, 
alternatively, “proof that reasonable efforts have been made to obtain 
consent to such designation.”40 
In sum, because an FCP lacks overall legal enforceability, it is of 
little assistance if a custody dispute erupts between a deployed 
servicemember, who created the plan, and a non-military party with 
legally enforceable custody rights.41  If the non-military, non-custodial 
natural or adoptive parent challenges the FCP and seeks to modify 
the custody status of the child in court, the FCP has no legally 
binding effect.42  Some states, though, have made efforts to provide 
greater legal protections for the rights of deployed military personnel 
in the child custody context.43  Part III explores these efforts and the 
associated problems and shortcomings. 
III. STATE-COURT EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHILD CUSTODY ISSUES FOR 
RETURNING SERVICEMEMBERS 
Single-parent servicemembers who arrange for temporary 
custody of their children, often through FCPs, and plan to resume 
physical custody following deployment face certain legal 
complications.  There is a tension at times between state family law’s 
“best interests of the child” standard and the servicemember’s 
interest in resuming custody of his or her child. 
 
 37  U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY 5-5 (2008). 
 38  Id.  
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. (emphasis added).  
 41  Shawn P. Ayotte, Note, Protecting Servicemembers from Unfair Custody Decisions 
While Preserving the Child’s Best Interests, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 655, 662 (2011). 
 42  See generally id.  
 43  See Jeffrey P. Sexton & Jonathan Brent, Child Custody and Deployments: The States 
Step in to Fill the SCRA Gap, 2008 ARMY LAW. 9, 11 (2008). 
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A. “Best Interests of the Child” Framework and Custody Modification 
In 2000, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right 
of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of their children.44  In general, courts aim to make decisions 
in accordance with the best interests of the child while remaining 
within constitutional parameters.45  Courts will typically look to a 
variety of factors to determine what is in the child’s best interests 
when making a custody determination.46  The Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act, though enacted in only a handful of states, codifies 
factors that courts commonly rely upon in most jurisdictions.47  These 
factors include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his 
custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) 
the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his 
parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who 
may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (4) the 
child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community; 
and (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals 
involved.48 
Most courts will modify a custody decision only if there is a 
“substantial change in circumstances.”49  States vary, however, on the 
specific requirements to obtain a hearing and the standards used for 
modification.50  For example, the Supreme Court of Florida has held 
that a two-part substantial change test applies to modification of all 
child custody agreements:51 the movant seeking modification of 
custody must show both that the circumstances have substantially and 
materially changed since the original custody determination and that 
the child’s best interests justify changing custody.52  The substantial 
 
 44  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 399 (1923) (“liberty” under the Due Process Clause includes the right of the 
individual to “establish a home and bring up children”); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (discussing “the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”). 
 45  WALTER WADLINGTON & RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN, FAMILY LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 7 (3d 
ed. 2012).   
 46  JUDITH AREEN ET AL., FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 768 (6th ed. 2012). 
 47  See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (amended 1973). 
 48  Id.  
 49  JUDITH AREEN ET AL., supra note 46, at 948.  
 50  LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 17:1 (2013).  
 51  Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla. 2005). 
 52  Id. at 931 n.2.  
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change must be one that was not reasonably contemplated at the 
time of the original judgment.53  In Alaska, an award of custody of a 
child or visitation with the child “may be modified if the court 
determines that a change in circumstances requires the modification 
of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the 
child.”54 
One risk associated with these standards in the context of 
military servicemember custody disputes is that “the court will view 
the servicemember’s military profession, and the possibility of future 
deployments, as a detrimental factor when determining what custody 
solution would be in the ‘best interest’ of the child.”55  This can be 
attributed to the emphasis courts generally place on assuring 
continuity for the child,56 and the fact that military service can involve 
mobilization and deployment that disrupts continuity and stability.57  
In recent years, state legislatures have enacted child custody 
protections for servicemembers,58 some of which aim to address this 
potential risk and to provide greater protection for servicemembers’ 
interests.59  The ULC, however, has identified several persistent 
problems.60 
B. State Variations in Child Custody Laws For Servicemembers 
The ULC has identified significant variation in states’ 
approaches to custody issues raised by a parent’s deployment, 
including how some courts will grant custody to the other legal 
parent for the duration of the deployment, sometimes over the 
wishes of the deploying parent, while other courts will grant custody 
to the person that the servicemember wishes to designate as 
custodian (e.g., a grandparent).61  Importantly, the ULC also notes 
that some courts will not overturn a “temporary” custody 
arrangement granted to the non-deployed parent when the 
servicemember returns “unless the child is shown to be significantly 
 
 53  Id.  
 54  ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.20.110 (West 2013). 
 55  Sexton & Brent, supra note 43, at 9.  
 56  JUDITH AREEN ET AL., supra note 46, at 769.  
 57  See generally Ayotte, supra note 41, at 672.  
 58  Christopher Missick, Comment, Child Custody Protections in the Servicemembers 
Civil Relief Act: Congress Acts to Protect Parents Serving in the Armed Forces, 29 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 857, 875 (2008).   
 59  See infra notes 65, 66, 70 and accompanying text.  
 60  See Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act Summary, supra note 24. 
 61  Id. 
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worse off living with the non-deployed natural parent.”62  This 
standard, of course, presents extreme difficulties for most deployed 
parents to overcome.  This is because, as one scholar put it, “[t]he 
soldier is at a disadvantage in a custody suit brought before the court 
either during or after deployment, because the other parent has 
often gained an advantage by being the custodial parent during the 
deployment.”63  The non-servicemember parent “is the last person to 
have created and maintained the child’s home and community 
connections.”64 
A look at the laws of just a few states demonstrates the 
inconsistency among state laws on this complex issue.  For example, 
Kentucky’s statute provides that any court-ordered modification of a 
child custody decree based, in whole or in part, on the active duty of 
a parent deployed outside the United States or federal active duty 
shall be temporary and revert back to the previous child custody decree 
at the end of the deployment or federal active duty, as appropriate.65  
Noticeably, the statute does not address or prohibit deployment itself 
as a consideration during a best interests determination. 
By contrast, Arizona’s statute covers similar, yet additional, 
ground.66  According to the statute, if a parent with whom the child 
resides a majority of the time is deployed, a court shall not enter a 
final order modifying a preexisting order until ninety days after the 
deployment ends, unless a modification is agreed to by the deploying 
parent.67  Moreover, a court “shall not consider a parent’s absence 
caused by deployment or mobilization or the potential for future 
deployment or mobilization as the sole factor supporting a real, 
substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances pursuant to 
this section.”68  All temporary modification orders must include a 
specific transition schedule to facilitate a return to the pre-
deployment order within ten days after the deployment ends, 
however, “taking into consideration the child’s best interests.”69 
 
 
 62  Id. 
 63  Darrell Baughn, Divorce & Deployment: Representing the Military Servicemember, 
FAM. ADVOC., Fall 2005, at 8, 12.   
 64  Ayotte, supra note 41, at 672.  
 65  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.340(5)(2) (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
 66  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-411 (West 2013).  
 67  Id. at § 25-411(B).   
 68  Id. at § 25-411(C) (emphasis added). 
 69  Id. at § 25-411(H). 
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South Dakota’s statute70 is comprehensive.  There is a noticeable 
difference between its provision regarding assessment of past or 
future deployment in considering a substantial and material change 
of circumstances and Arizona’s provision doing the same.  Under the 
South Dakota statute, a servicemember ordered to deployment, who 
is the physical custodian of a minor, may delegate by a power of 
attorney to another person for a period of one year or less any of the 
powers regarding care and custody of the minor child.71  Notably, 
“[n]either the execution of such a power of attorney . . . nor the 
deployment itself, may be considered a factor in considering a 
substantial and material change of circumstances, nor a factor in a 
best interest of the child determination for purposes of permanent 
child custody modification proceedings.”72  This contrasts with 
Arizona’s statute, which states that a court shall not consider absence 
caused by deployment or the potential for future deployment as the 
sole factor supporting a real, substantial, and unanticipated change in 
circumstances.73  South Dakota’s statute also includes a provision for 
“an automatic stay of all proceedings seeking a permanent change in 
custody of a minor child where the parent with physical custody is a 
servicemember called to active duty for deployment.”74  Such a stay 
shall continue for the period of service due to deployment, unless 
waived in writing by the servicemember.75  Furthermore, any 
temporary order modifying physical custody of the child 
automatically terminates when the servicemember returns from 
deployment and reverts back to the custody status in effect prior to 
the deployment.76  If, however, upon the servicemember’s return 
from the deployment either the servicemember or child “exhibits a 
substantial and material change in circumstances which adversely 
affects the servicemember’s ability to adequately care for the child, 
the best interests of the child shall be determinative.”77  Thus, while 
 
 70  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 33-6-10 (West 2012).  Notably, as of early 2014, South 
Dakota’s legislature was considering enacting the ULC’s UDPCVA, but it is unclear 
whether or not it will successfully do so.  As it currently stands, § 33-6-10 remains in 
effect.  See Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Deployed%20Parents%20Custody%20a
nd%20Visitation%20Act (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).  
 71  § 33-6-10.  
 72  Id. (emphasis added).  
 73  See supra note 68 and accompanying text.   
 74  § 33-6-10. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. 
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Kentucky and South Dakota both use the specific language “revert 
back,” South Dakota’s statute provides much more detail on when 
this should happen, whereas Kentucky simply states “as 
appropriate.”78 
As these three state statutes show, there is considerable variation 
among state attempts to provide guidance and, in some ways, greater 
protections for servicemembers who maintained physical custody of 
their minor children prior to deployment.  Some states have not even 
adopted any statutes on this issue.79  Overall, the variation in the states 
creates a “patchwork of laws,”80 which, as the following Parts of this 
Comment discuss, is highly problematic. 
IV. THE SCRA AND THE TURNER AMENDMENT: A FEDERAL ATTEMPT TO 
STRENGTHEN PROTECTIONS FOR MILITARY SERVICEMEMBERS 
At the state level, there exists a serious lack in uniformity of 
legislation that addresses custody matters for single-parent 
servicemembers.  This lack of uniformity in custody laws specifically 
addressing servicemembers is problematic due to the unique nature 
of military work.  Military service is not only especially mobile in 
nature, but it is also necessary for national protection.  Arguably, 
greater predictability and uniformity is needed for servicemember 
child custody laws because the states’ variant laws make it “difficult 
for [military] parents to resolve these important issues quickly and 
fairly [and] hurt[] the ability of deploying parents to serve the 
country effectively[.]”81  Unfortunately, current federal law also 
proves inadequate to fully address servicemembers’ custody interests. 
A. Problems with the Current SCRA 
The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”) is federal 
legislation enacted in 2003 aimed at protecting certain legal rights of 
United States servicemembers.82  Congress passed the SCRA to clarify 
 
 78  See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 79  Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act Summary, supra note 24; see also DAVID 
F. BURRELLI & MICHAEL A. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43091, MILITARY PARENTS 
AND CHILD CUSTODY: STATE AND FEDERAL ISSUES 31–36 (2013) (citing Alabama, 
Minnesota, and New Mexico as having no state law provisions related to U.S. 
servicemembers and child custody).  
 80  Missick, supra note 58, at 875.  
 81  Why States Should Adopt the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act, 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Deployed_Parents
/UDPCVA%20Why%20States(1).pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).  
 82  See Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 108–189, 177 Stat. 2835 
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and revise the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act (“SSCRA”).83  The 
SSCRA essentially “gave trial courts discretion to grant relief when a 
litigant’s military status would materially affect the servicemember’s 
ability to protect his or her legal rights or comply with the obligation 
in question.”84  Under the current SCRA, the court shall, upon 
application by the servicemember, stay any civil action or proceeding, 
including any child custody proceeding, for a period of not less than 
ninety days if the particular application conditions are met.85  An 
application must include a letter or other communication stating the 
manner in which current military duty requirements materially affect 
the servicemember’s ability to appear and a letter or communication 
from the servicemember’s commanding officer stating that the 
servicemember’s current military duty prevents appearance.86  One of 
the stated purposes of the SCRA is “to provide for, strengthen, and 
expedite the national defense through protection extended by [the] 
Act to servicemembers . . . to enable such persons to devote their 
entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation.”87  The SCRA’s 
protections apply to active-duty members of the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, as well as National Guard 
members called to active service.88 
Despite the procedural protection the SCRA provides for 
servicemembers, scholars have identified several pitfalls of the SCRA 
in its current state.  First, the SCRA does not require courts to grant 
stays for the duration of a servicemember’s deployment.89  The 
language of the SCRA provides only “for a period of not less than 90 
 
(2003) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–594 (2006)).  
 83  Paquin, supra note 21, at 545.  
 84  Sara Estrin, Article, The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act: Why and How This Act 
Applies to Child Custody Proceedings, 27 LAW & INEQ. 211, 214 (2009) (quoting Mark S. 
Cohen, Entitlement to a Stay or Default Judgment Relief Under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil 
Relief Act, 35 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 323, 333 (2007)). 
 85  § 522.  Notably, in 2008 Section 202(a) of the SCRA (now 50 U.S.C. app. § 
522(a)) was amended by inserting, “including any child custody proceeding,” after 
what had originally said only “civil action or proceeding.”  Similarly, Section 201(a) 
of the SCRA (now 50 U.S.C. app. § 521(a)), pertaining to protection of 
servicemembers against default judgments, was amended by inserting, “including any 
child custody proceeding,” after “proceeding.”  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–181, § 584, 122 Stat. 3, 128 (2008); see also 
Missick, supra note 58, at 874.  
 86  § 522.  
 87  Id. at § 502.  
 88  Id. at § 511.  
 89  Sexton & Brent, supra note 43, at 9–10. 
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days,”90 meaning that if a servicemember is deployed for more than 
ninety days a court could technically move forward with legal 
proceedings while the servicemember is deployed.91  Further, though 
the SCRA purports to stay custody proceedings for a period of not less 
than ninety days, case law has shown that courts have “sidestepped 
the SCRA” by issuing temporary custody orders despite the SCRA’s 
mandated stays.92  For example, in a Pennsylvania case, Tallon v. 
DaSilva, a mother and father shared physical custody of their child.93  
When the father was deployed on active military service, he executed 
a power of attorney to assign his custody rights to his mother (the 
child’s grandmother).94  In an emergency motion, the mother 
requested that the court enter an interim order awarding her primary 
physical and legal custody pending the father’s return from 
deployment.95  The court acknowledged that the stay provision of the 
SCRA necessarily applies to custody cases.96  The court then asserted 
that “a child does not exist in ‘suspended animation’ during the 
pendency of any stay entered pursuant to the SCRA” and that “the 
issue of the child’s custody during a parent’s deployment must 
perforce be addressed.”97  The court awarded temporary primary 
custody to the mother while the father was deployed.98 
Similarly, in Lenser v. McGowan, a mother and father were living 
separately, but they were not yet divorced.99  The paternal 
grandmother was caring for the child when the circuit court entered 
a temporary custody order awarding custody to the mother.100  The 
circuit court actually entered this temporary custody order before it 
entered the SCRA stay for the servicemember father.101  The Supreme 
Court of Arkansas, however, held that even if the stay had been in 
place when the circuit court considered temporary custody, it would 
not have prevented the circuit court from issuing the order.102  It 
 
 90  § 522.  
 91  See generally Sexton & Brent, supra note 43, at 9–10. 
 92  Ayotte, supra note 41, at 670.  
 93  Tallon v. DaSilva, No. FD02-4291-003 (Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny Cnty., Pa. 2005), 
reprinted in 153 PITTSBURGH LEGAL J. 164, 165 (2005). 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id.  
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Lenser v. McGowan, 191 S.W.3d 506, 507 (Ark. 2004).  
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. at 509.  
 102  Id. at 511.  
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reasoned that the stay of the SCRA “does not freeze a case in 
permanent limbo and leave a circuit court with no authority to act at 
all.”103 
While a temporary order of custody in favor of the non-
servicemember may not seem especially unfair to the servicemember 
parent, these temporary orders are increasingly likely to become 
permanent.104  This is because “stability” and “connection” often carry 
significant weight in a subsequent custody battle.105  As one scholar 
put it, “[t]he end result is that the non-servicemember parent is able 
to use the servicemember parent’s absence to initiate proceedings for 
temporary custody that ultimately culminate in a permanent custody 
order.”106  Additionally, despite the SCRA’s procedural protections, in 
some states a servicemember’s past or future deployment itself may 
have a substantive impact on future custody determinations if it is 
considered as a “best interest” factor.107  Some may argue that this is 
necessary, particularly where, for example, the child was very young 
when the parent was deployed and it would be destabilizing to 
change the custody arrangement.108  There is a difference, however, 
between using a servicemember’s past or future deployment itself as a 
sort of automatic strike against the servicemember in a best interests 
determination and a consideration of any significant impact on the 
best interests of the child of the parent’s past or possible future 
deployment.  A servicemember parent is at least given a chance at 
establishing that there has been no significant impact on the child 
with the latter option, whereas with the former this chance is 
absolutely precluded. 
 
 
 103  Id. at 509.  Notably, these two cases, Tallon and Lenser, were decided prior to 
the 2008 amendment of Section 202(a) of the SCRA (now 50 U.S.C. app. § 522(a)) 
to state, “including any child custody proceeding,” after what had originally said only 
“civil action or proceeding.”  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110–181, § 584, 122 Stat. 3, 128 (2008).  Both courts recognized, 
however, that the SCRA included a stay provision that was applicable in custody 
cases.   
 104  Ayotte, supra note 41, at 670.  
 105  Id. at 672. 
 106  Id. at 673.  The non-servicemember parent also might already have temporary 
custody through the agreed upon FCP.  Still, there is the same potential that the 
temporary arrangement will become permanent upon the servicemember’s return.   
 107  Sexton & Brent, supra note 43, at 11; see also Child Custody Bill Executive 
Summary, CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL TURNER, http://turner.house.gov/uploadedfiles
/turner_one_page_executive_summary_on_child_custody_bill_final.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2014).  
 108  See generally Ayotte, supra note 41, at 672.   
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B. Amendment Proposal for the SCRA 
Congressman Michael Turner (R-Ohio) has proposed a bill to 
amend the SCRA.109  In doing so, he has expressed the following 
viewpoint: 
It’s a disservice to our military personnel to think their 
leadership does not value their commitment enough to 
provide needed federal child-custody protection while on 
active duty . . . . Penalizing a service member for their [sic] 
performance of duty is unfair and a dishonor to our military 
parents who freely give so much to this nation.110 
As described in Congressman Turner’s Executive Summary, his 
bill initially aimed to (i) prohibit state courts from using past 
deployments or the possibility of deployment against servicemembers 
when making child custody determinations, (ii) prohibit courts from 
permanently altering custody orders during a parent’s deployment, 
and (iii) require pre-deployment custody to be reinstated unless that 
is not in the best interest of the child.111 
C. Political Hurdles 
Since 2008, legislative language addressing this issue has passed 
the House of Representatives six times as part of the House version of 
the National Defense Authorization Act (Fiscal Years (FY) 2008–
2013).112  The language has also passed the House as a stand-alone bill 
(H.R. 6048) by voice vote in 2008.113  All versions of the proposed 
legislation, however, have failed to pass in the Senate.114  Most 
recently, Congressman Turner introduced another legislative effort 
to amend Title II of the SCRA, H.R. 1898, to the House on May 8, 
2013.115  H.R. 1898 was referred to the Subcommittee on Economic 
 
 109  Child Custody Bill Executive Summary, supra note 107.  
 110  Michael R. Turner, Op-Ed., Ensuring Child-Custody Protection, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 
8, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/08/ensuring-child-
custody-protection/. 
 111  Child Custody Bill Executive Summary, supra note 107.  The language of the bill 
has subsequently been altered.  See infra note 129 and accompanying text.   
 112  BURRELLI & MILLER, supra note 79, at 3; see also Press Release, Congressman 
Michael Turner, House Overwhelmingly Approves Turner’s Military Child Custody 
Bill (May 30, 2012), available at http://turner.house.gov/news
/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=297678.  
 113  BURRELLI & MILLER, supra note 79, at 3; see also Letter from Michael R. Turner 
and Robert Andrews, supra note 27. 
 114  BURRELLI & MILLER, supra note 79, at 3.  
 115  Id. at 1.  
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Opportunity on May 24, 2013, but no action has been taken since.116 
Despite previous passage of the proposed legislation in the 
House, the Senate Armed Services Committee has seemingly 
remained unconvinced of the need for a federal legislative 
amendment.117  In a June 2012 report responding to the House 
version of the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee asserted that “[a] federal legal 
standard would preempt the efforts of the States over a matter 
traditionally left to State courts.”118  The Senate Armed Services 
Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to request the “views 
and recommendations” of the Council of Governors regarding 
legislative proposals to amend Title II of the SCRA or “otherwise to 
establish federal law that would prohibit State courts from 
considering the absence of a service member by reason of 
deployment, or the possibility of deployment, in determining the best 
interest of the child in cases involving child custody.”119  The Senate 
Armed Services Committee requested the Secretary to ensure that the 
views and recommendations of the Council of Governors would be 
submitted to the Committees on Armed Services and Committees on 
Veterans’ Affairs of the Senate and the House of Representatives no 
later than March 1, 2013.120  This request from the Senate Armed 
Services Committee was not included in the final Senate version of 
the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 3254) and, 
therefore, was not included in the final version of the FY 2013 
National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112–239).121 
The Department of Defense has also opposed federal child 
custody protections for servicemembers.122  A Department of Defense 
(“DOD”) statement from 2009 asserted the following: 
The Department of Defense opposes efforts to create 
Federal child custody legislation affecting Service 
members . . . . By encouraging each State to address the 
issues within the context of their already-existing body of 
 
 116  Id. at 21; see also H.R. 1898, CONGRESS.GOV, 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1898 (last visited Feb. 26, 
2014). 
 117  Senators Still Skeptical of Federal Child Custody Protections, supra note 20. 
 118  S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2013, S. REP. NO. 112–73, at 119 (2012). 
 119  Id. at 118–19. 
 120  Id. at 119. 
 121  BURRELLI & MILLER, supra note 79, at 10.  
 122  Michael R. Turner, Op-Ed., supra note 110. 
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State law, these cases will proceed quicker and more 
smoothly with less likelihood of lengthy appellate review.  
We strongly believe that Federal legislation in this area of 
the law, which has historically and almost exclusively been 
handled by the States, would be counterproductive.123 
Moreover, pursuant to language in the FY 2010 National 
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111–84, sec. 572), the DOD 
submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 
House a report on child custody litigation involving 
servicemembers.124  Among its many conclusions, this DOD report 
stated that “[t]here is no evidence of any trend in family courts to 
remove custody of minor children from servicemembers solely as a 
result of deployment or the prospect of deployment.”125 
Nevertheless, in 2011, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
reportedly sent a letter to Congressman Michael Turner indicating a 
changed position.126  Turner stated in his February 18, 2011 press 
release that Gates wrote that he believed the Department of Defense 
should change its position to one that was “willing to consider 
whether appropriate legislation can be crafted that provides Service 
members with a federal uniform standard of protection in cases 
where it is established that military service is the sole factor involved 
in a child custody decision involving a Service member[.]”127 
In a March 29, 2012 letter to then-Secretary of Defense, Leon 
Panetta, Congressmen Michael Turner and Robert Andrews enclosed 
the letter from Secretary Gates and stated that they looked forward to 
 
 123  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSITION 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/DOD_position_child_custody.pdf. 
 124  BURRELLI & MILLER, supra note 79, at 11.  
 125  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION INVOLVING SERVICE 
OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES 29 (2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/lamp/dow
nloads/child_custody_report_14_may_2010.authcheckdam.pdf (emphasis in 
original).  Notably, the House Armed Services Committee later expressed concern 
with the DOD report, concluding that “there is not sufficient data available to 
ascertain the full scope of how many members of the Armed Forces experience the 
loss of child custody as a result of their service.”  H. COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, H. REP. NO. 111–491, at 
285 (2010).  
 126  Karen Jowers, Gates Now Supports Law to Protect Child Custody, ARMY TIMES (Feb. 
17, 2011), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/02/military-child-custody-gates-
021711w/.  
 127  Press Release, Congressman Michael Turner, Gates Joins Turner in Fight for 
Service Member Child Custody Rights (Feb. 18, 2011), available at 
http://turner.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=225787. 
GROMEK (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2014  3:20 PM 
890 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:873 
 
the same level of support.128  Secretary Panetta reportedly sent 
Congressman Turner a letter in April 2012 with input on how the 
proposed legislation could be revised.129  During Secretary Panetta’s 
testimony before a Joint House Armed Services and Veterans’ Affairs 
Committee Hearing on July 25, 2012, Turner raised the legislation to 
Secretary Panetta, who replied, “As I indicated to you in my letter, I 
support the efforts that you’ve made.  You’ve provided tremendous 
leadership on this issue, and I will do the same with regards to the 
amendments on the Senate side.”130  With Chuck Hagel now serving 
as Secretary of Defense,131 however, the current level of support from 
the Department of Defense for Congressman Turner’s proposal is 
unclear.132 
Meanwhile, opinions from some expert associations and 
individuals have been particularly critical toward Congressman 
Turner’s proposed legislation.133  Many of these concerns are 
grounded in federalism.  For example, Patricia Apy, on behalf of the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”), provided a submission for the 
record to the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs in 2010 
regarding the ABA’s opposition to the bill.  Her submission included 
the argument that by amending the SCRA to accomplish its aims, the 
bill “will unintentionally but surely introduce federal litigation to a 
matter reserved to the states and in which the federal government has 
no expertise.”134  Expressing similar sentiments in his witness 
 
 128  Letter from Michael R. Turner and Robert Andrews, supra note 27. 
 129  BURRELLI & MILLER, supra note 79, at 13–14.  Secretary Panetta suggested 
incorporating the language “as the sole factor,” which has been incorporated into 
the most recent legislative proposal, H.R. 1898.  Id. at 14; see also H.R. 1898, 113th 
Cong. § 208(b) (2013).  
 130  Back from the Battlefield: DOD and VA Collaboration to Assist Service Members 
Returning to Civilian Life: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services and H. Comm. on 
Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Congress (2012), available at 
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-
display?ContentRecord_id=d6cf0b67-de1b-468e-8114-4152fdae2122&ContentType
_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=41030bc2-0d05-4138-841f-
90b0fbaa0f88&MonthDisplay=7&YearDisplay=2012. 
 131  Chuck Hagel: Secretary of Defense, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=365 (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2014).  
 132  BURRELLI & MILLER, supra note 79, at 14.  
 133  See infra notes 134–136.  
 134  Hearing on H.R. 4469 Before the Subcomm. on Economic Opportunity of the H. Comm. 
on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (submission for the record of Patricia E. Apy, 
Chair of the ABA Family Law Section Military Law Committee, American Bar 
Association).  The ABA has at other times recorded its opposition to this federal 
child custody legislation, including in a White Paper posted in 2013 and in ABA 
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testimony to the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Retired 
Army JAG Colonel Mark E. Sullivan135 asserted that “[t]he passage of 
an overarching gridwork of Federal law in a field which has always 
been reserved for the states will completely destroy the initiative of 
those states which are considering initial legislation or thinking about 
improving their current laws to protect military members and their 
children.”136  Other associations that have maintained opposition to 
federal legislation regarding this topic include the National 
Governors Association, the Adjutants General Association of the 
United States, and the National Military Family Association.137 
Ultimately, though Congressman Turner’s proposed SCRA 
amendment is well intentioned, it is highly unlikely that his approach 
will ever be successful due to the political impasse.  Since 2008, 
Congressman Turner’s proposed legislative language has passed in 
the House many times, yet it has always been subsequently rejected in 
the Senate.138  Without sufficient support in Congress and from family 
law experts for the amended SCRA, servicemembers’ legal 
proponents must find a more realistic solution. 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL: THE 
UNIFORM DEPLOYED PARENTS CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT 
Given concerns about an amendment to the SCRA, some critics 
have instead endorsed the ULC’s recent proposal.139  The ULC has set 
forth the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act 
(“UDPCVA”) to address the states’ “patchwork of rules.”140  The ULC 
consists of more than 300 commissioners, including lawyers and 
judges, who are appointed by state governments to draft and propose 
statutes in areas of the law where uniformity among the states is 
 
Resolution 106 passed in 2009.  See White Paper on Federal Military Custody, AM. BAR 
ASS’N (2013); ABA Res. 106 (2009).   
 135  Mark E. Sullivan is the author of The Military Divorce Handbook and has helped 
state legislatures and bar associations with military custody and visitation bills in 
several states.  Hearing on H.R. 4469 Before the Subcomm. on Economic Opportunity of the 
H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (witness testimony of Mark E. 
Sullivan, Colonel, USA (Ret.)). 
 136  Id.  
 137  BURRELLI & MILLER, supra note 79, at 15–16.  
 138  See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.  
 139  Mark E. Sullivan, The Uniform Deployed Parent Custody and Visitation Act, FAM. 
LAW., Sept. 27, 2012, available at http://familylawyermagazine.com/articles/the-
uniform-deployed-parent-custody-and-visitation-act.  
 140  Why States Should Adopt the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act, 
supra note 81.  
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desirable.141  The Commission approved and recommended the 
UDPCVA for enactment in all the states at the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’ annual conference held 
July 13–19, 2012.142 
A. The Proposed UDPCVA 
The UDPCVA, as proposed by the ULC, is organized into five 
articles.143  Article 1 provides that in a proceeding for custodial 
responsibility of a servicemember’s child, a court may not consider a 
parent’s past deployment or possible future deployment in itself in 
determining the best interest of the child but may consider any 
significant impact on the best interest of the child of the parent’s past 
or possible future deployment.144  Articles 2 and 3 address two distinct 
possible scenarios.  Article 2 provides a procedure for parents who 
agree to a custody arrangement during deployment and enter into a 
“temporary agreement.”145  Article 3 establishes that, in the absence of 
such an agreement, a court may issue a temporary order granting 
custodial responsibility after a deploying parent receives notice of 
deployment and during the deployment.146  Under Article 3, however, 
a court may not issue a permanent order granting custodial 
responsibility without the consent of the deploying parent.147  Article 
4 addresses return from deployment. The article contains procedures 
for when the parents agree that the temporary custody agreement 
formed pursuant to Article 2 should be terminated, procedures for 
when the parents agree that the temporary custody order formed 
pursuant to Article 3 should be terminated, and procedures for when 
there is no parental agreement regarding the termination of the 
temporary custody arrangement.148  Lastly, Article 5 contains 
 
 141  About the ULC, supra note 25.  
 142  UNIF. DEPLOYED PARENTS CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT §§ 101–504 (2012), 
available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Deployed_Parents/2012_DPCVA_Final.p
df. 
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. at § 107.  
 145  Id. at § 201.  
 146  Id. at § 302.  
 147  Id.  
 148  UNIF. DEPLOYED PARENTS CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT §§ 401–404 (2012), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Deployed_Parents
/2012_DPCVA_Final.pdf.   
If an agreement between the parties to terminate a temporary order 
for custodial responsibility under [Article] 3 has not been filed, the 
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miscellaneous provisions, such as an effective date provision and a 
transition provision.149 
B. The Advantages of Adopting the UDPCVA 
The UDPCVA approach will help to provide greater protections 
for and fairness to servicemembers in custody matters.  The UDPCVA 
provides that a court may not consider a parent’s past deployment or 
possible future deployment in itself in determining the best interest 
of the child, but may consider any significant impact on the best 
interest of the child of the parent’s past or possible future 
deployment.150  A comment to the UDPCVA provides greater insight 
into what is meant by “significant” impact: 
The term ‘significant’ is meant to exclude the court’s 
considering trivial impact of a parent’s deployment, such as 
the need to enroll a child in a different school.  Under this 
standard, the court may only consider impacts that are 
material or substantial.  For example, the court may 
consider that the child has bonded closely with step-siblings 
while in a temporary custody arrangement during a 
deployment, or that the child does not adjust well to new 
situations and therefore will likely have difficulty relocating 
if a parent is deployed in the future.151 
Accordingly, the UDPCVA is helpful to servicemembers because 
using deployment itself as a best interests factor necessarily works 
against the servicemember.  The court may still consider “any 
significant impact” of the deployment on the best interests of the 
child.152  The court, however, may not consider any trivial impact of a 
parent’s deployment,153 which again works to the advantage of the 
servicemember. 
Under Article 4 of the UDPCVA, in the event that the parents do 
not agree on whether to terminate a temporary custody arrangement 
established by court order, the custody arrangement terminates sixty 
 
order terminates [60] days after the deploying parent gives notice to 
the other parent and any nonparent granted custodial responsibility 
that the deploying parent has returned from deployment.   
Id. at § 404.  
 149  Id. at §§ 501–04.  
 150  Id. at § 107. 
 151  Id. at § 107 cmt.  
 152  Id.  
 153  UNIF. DEPLOYED PARENTS CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT § 107 cmt. (2012), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Deployed_Parents
/2012_DPCVA_Final.pdf.   
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days after the deploying parent gives notice to the other parent that 
the deploying parent returned from deployment.154  As the ULC’s 
comment points out, concerns about the child’s best interests 
“resulted in rejection in the UDPCVA of an immediate, automatic 
reversion to the previous custody order following the service 
member’s return.”155  The “time lag” allows the other parent time to 
contest the reversion of custody under other state law if the parent 
believes the reversion is not in the best interest of the child.156  This 
section can be viewed as an attempt to balance fairness to all parties.  
Altogether, the UDPCVA seeks to “ensure that parents who serve 
their country are not penalized for their service, while still giving 
adequate weight to the interests of the other parent, and, most 
importantly, the best interest of the child.”157 
The states’ adoption of the UDPCVA is preferable to 
amendment of the SCRA for several reasons.  First, the UDPCVA is 
more explicit in its protections for servicemembers.  Both the 
UDPCVA and the SCRA amendment prohibit courts from 
considering a servicemember parent’s past deployment or possible 
future deployment in itself as an automatic strike against the 
servicemember in a child custody determination.158  Congressman 
Turner’s proposed SCRA amendment, however, requires pre-
deployment custody to be reinstated “unless the court finds that such 
a reinstatement is not in the best interest of the child . . . .”159  The 
UDPCVA, on the other hand, allows courts to consider any 
“significant impact” on the best interest of the child of the parent’s 
past or possible future deployment.160  Arguably, a “significant 
impact” on the best interests of the child is a clearer and higher 
standard than simply “not in the best interest of the child.”161  It is 
possible there could be situations where a servicemember would 
 
 154  Id. at § 404.  
 155  Id. at art. 4 cmt.  
 156  Id. 
 157  Id. at §§ 101–504 prefatory note.  
 158  The proposed SCRA amendment uses the term “as the sole factor” and the 
UDPCVA uses the term “in itself,” though both convey the same meaning.  H.R. 
1898, 113th Cong. § 208(b) (2013); UNIF. DEPLOYED PARENTS CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
ACT § 107 (2012), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared
/docs/Deployed_Parents/2012_DPCVA_Final.pdf. 
 159  H.R. 1898, 113th Cong. § 208(a) (2013).  
 160  UNIF. DEPLOYED PARENTS CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT § 107 (2012), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Deployed_Parents/2012_DPCVA_Final.p
df. 
 161  Id.; H.R. 1898, 113th Cong. § 208(a) (2013).  
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resume physical custody under the UDPCVA because there was no 
“significant impact” but may permanently lose physical custody under 
the proposed SCRA amendment’s vaguer standard.  Even situations 
like those of Michael Grantham and Eva Crouch may play out 
differently depending on the applicable law, with a potentially 
greater likelihood under the UDPCVA that the servicemembers 
would achieve the return of their children.162  Additionally, the 
UDPCVA approach will likely placate federalist concerns.  As noted 
supra, critics’ concerns have been grounded in the idea that an 
amended SCRA will introduce federal litigation to a matter reserved 
to the states and in which the federal government has no expertise.163  
The ABA, for example, has specifically stated, “[i]t is not the province 
of federal law to provide detailed and specific instructions on how to 
handle child custody cases . . . .”164  The UDPCVA, though of course 
intended to provide uniformity across the states, ensures that child 
custody laws remain state law, rather than federal law.165 
Furthermore, the UDPCVA avoids altogether an argument 
regarding a federal right of action.  The Supreme Court has 
previously emphasized how “federal courts . . . lack the close 
association with state and local government organizations dedicated 
to handling issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce, alimony, 
and child custody decrees.”166  Earlier versions of the SCRA 
amendment bill have stated that “[n]othing in [the] section shall 
create a Federal right of action.”167  Nevertheless, critics were still able 
to argue that there were other ways counsel could get a case involving 
federal rights into federal courts.168  These include the removal 
procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) and possibly a declaratory 
judgment suit in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.169  The 
 
 162  See supra Part I.  Ultimately, Eva Crouch did regain custody, but her case 
proceeded all the way to the Kentucky Supreme Court.  Crouch v. Crouch, 201 
S.W.3d 463, 466 (Ky. 2006). 
 163  See supra Part IV.C.  
 164  White Paper on Federal Military Custody, supra note 134, at 2.  
 165  See infra Part VI for a discussion of how the UDPCVA should be implemented 
and why the approach should not raise federalism concerns.  
 166  Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992).  
 167  See, e.g., H.R. 4201, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 4469, 111th Cong. (2010).  
 168  Hearing on H.R. 4469 Before the Subcomm. on Economic Opportunity of the H. Comm. 
on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (witness testimony of Mark E. Sullivan, 
Colonel, USA (Ret.)). 
 169  28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a) (2012) (“A civil or criminal prosecution in a court of a 
State of the United States against a member of the armed forces of the United 
States . . . in respect to which he claims any right, title, or authority under a law of the 
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language of the most recent version of the SCRA amendment bill, 
H.R. 1898, attempts to quiet previous criticisms by explicitly stating 
that, “[n]othing in this section shall create a Federal right of action 
or otherwise give rise to Federal jurisdiction or create a right of 
removal.”170  Perhaps this bill language would be effective at 
preventing any of these custody cases from reaching federal court.  A 
more certain way to address concerns regarding the potential for 
federal custody litigation, however, would be the adoption of the 
UDPCVA, since the UDPCVA would necessarily become state law 
once enacted in each state. 
C. Problems with the Proposed UDPCVA 
While the ULC has the authority to propose laws, no uniform 
law is effective until a state legislature adopts it.171  The uniform law 
commissioners work toward enactment of ULC acts in their home 
jurisdictions,172 but all fifty states may not choose to adopt the ULC’s 
suggested acts.  As of early 2014, a few states have adopted the 
UDPCVA.173  These states include Colorado, Nevada, North Carolina, 
and North Dakota.174  Nevertheless, given the ULC’s previous 
shortcomings in compelling all fifty states to adopt particular uniform 
laws, it remains unlikely that all the states will adopt the UDPCVA 
without some greater impetus to do so.175 
Indeed, several other of the ULC’s proposed schemes, in the 
family-law context and otherwise, have failed to provide the intended 
uniformity.  Within the family-law context, the 2002 Uniform 
Parentage Act addresses parentage determinations, including genetic 
testing and assisted conception provisions.176  Only a few states and 
the District of Columbia have adopted it.177  The Uniform 
 
United States respecting the armed forces thereof . . . may at any time before the 
trial . . . be removed for trial into the district court of the United States[.]”); 28 
U.S.C.A. § 2201 (2012). (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . 
any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of 
any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or 
could be sought.”). 
 170  H.R. 1898, 113th Cong. (2013).  
 171  About the ULC, supra note 25.  
 172  Id.  
 173  Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act, supra note 70.  
 174  Id.  
 175  See infra notes 176–179 and accompanying text.  
 176  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 101–905 (amended 2002). 
 177  Parentage Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org
/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
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Comparative Fault Act, which provides a system of allocating damages 
in personal injury actions, is another example among the many 
proposed uniform schemes that the states have failed to enact.178  
According to the ULC’s website, the only states to have enacted the 
Uniform Comparative Fault Act are Kentucky and Missouri.179 
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MUST 
ENCOURAGE STATES’ ADOPTION OF THE UDPCVA 
Although many of the ULC’s proposals have not been widely 
adopted, there are instances in which uniform laws have gained 
traction because the federal government has conditioned the receipt 
of federal funds upon the states’ adoption of the proposed law.  
Congress is able to attach conditions to the states’ receipt of federal 
funds because of its Spending Power under the United States 
Constitution.180  Though the Spending Power is subject to some 
limitations, Congress has routinely employed this power to ensure 
states’ compliance with certain laws and directives.181  Accordingly, 
the best way to ensure that all the states adopt the UDPCVA is to 
condition the states’ receipt of welfare funds upon their adoption of 
this uniform law. 
A. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act: A Roadmap for the 
UDPCVA 
In other notable instances, Congress has used its Spending 
Power to induce states into adopting the ULC’s recommendations.  
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) and the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(“UCCJEA”) are two examples of uniform laws that nearly all fifty 
states182 have enacted in exchange for federal assistance and 
funding.183  The UIFSA, first promulgated in 1992,184 provides uniform 
 
 178  See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §§ 1–11 (1977).  
 179  Comparative Fault Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org
/Act.aspx?title=Comparative%20Fault%20Act (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 180  See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.   
 181  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987).  
 182  All fifty states have enacted the UIFSA.  Patricia W. Hatamyar, Interstate 
Establishment, Enforcement, and Modification of Child Support Orders, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 511, 512 (2000).  Forty-nine states have adopted the UCCJEA.  JUDITH AREEN ET 
AL., supra note 46, at 1190. 
 183  WADLINGTON & O’BRIEN, supra note 45, at 3.  
 184  Hatamyar, supra note 182, at 514.  
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rules for the enforcement of family support orders by setting 
jurisdictional standards for state courts and “by determining the basis 
for a state to exercise continuing exclusive jurisdiction over a child 
support proceeding, by establishing rules for determining which state 
issues the controlling order in the event proceedings are initiated in 
multiple jurisdictions, and by providing rules for modifying . . . 
another state’s child support order.”185  In 1993, only two states had 
enacted the UIFSA, Arkansas and Texas.186  By the summer of 1996, 
this number totaled thirty-five states.187  That year was significant in 
the history of the UIFSA because the ULC then set forth significant 
amendments to the Act.188  Even more significantly, Congress passed 
“welfare reform” legislation in August, the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), 
which mandated that the states enact the amended UIFSA in order to 
receive federal funding for child support enforcement.189  As one 
scholar put it, in using the PRWORA to compel states to adopt the 
amended UIFSA, Congress “assured that nationwide acceptance of 
the amended Act was virtually certain.”190  Indeed, by 1998, all fifty 
states had enacted the UIFSA.191 
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(“UCCJEA”) is a second example of a uniform law that the states have 
adopted in response to Congress’s strategic use of its Spending 
Power.192  The ULC promulgated the UCCJEA in 1997, but there were 
other related acts prior to its enactment.193  First, the ULC 
promulgated the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”) 
in 1968 with the purpose of “1) establish[ing] jurisdiction over a 
child custody case in one state; and, 2) protect[ing] the order of that 
state from modification in any other state, so long as the original state 
 
 185  Interstate Family Support Act Amendments (2008) Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Interstate%20Family%20Supp
ort%20Act%20Amendments%20(2008) (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).  
 186  John J. Sampson & Barry J. Brooks, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (2001) 
with Prefatory Note and Comments (with Still More Unofficial Annotations), 36 FAM. L.Q. 
329, 337 (2002). 
 187  Id. 
 188  Id. 
 189  Id. at 338.  
 190  Id. at 337–38.  
 191  Id. at 338.  
 192  WADLINGTON & O’BRIEN, supra note 45, at 3.  
 193  Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Child%20Custody%20Jurisdict
ion%20and%20Enforcement%20Act (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
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retain[ed] jurisdiction over the case.”194  States were very slow, 
however, to adopt the UCCJA.195  Only forty-three states had adopted 
some form of the UCCJA by the time Congress enacted the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act (“PKPA”) in December 1980.196  The 
PKPA was “an effort to put the weight of full faith and credit behind 
the principles of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.”197  
Eventually, by 1984, all states adopted a version of the UCCJA,198 but 
differences between the UCCJA and the PKPA regarding applicable 
jurisdictional principles remained apparent.199  Therefore, in 1997, 
when the ULC finally promulgated the UCCJEA, it reconciled UCCJA 
principles with the PKPA and it also addressed interstate civil 
enforcement for child custody orders.200  Importantly, Congress 
conditioned the states’ receipt of federal assistance for children 
under the PRWORA on their adoption of the new UCCJEA.201  In 
response to Congress’s prompt, forty-nine states adopted the 
UCCJEA.202  The majority of states did so within four years.203  Overall, 
these two examples, the UIFSA and the UCCJEA, demonstrate that 
federal compulsion can be necessary for the states to efficiently adopt 
proposed uniform laws. 
 
 194  Id. 
 195  Ann T. Wilson, Comment, The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: Is There an 
Enforcement Role for the Federal Courts?, 62 WASH. L. REV. 841, 843 (1987). 
 196  Id. at 843 n.21.  
 197  Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act Summary, supra note 193.  
 198  Linda M. Demelis, Interstate Child Custody and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention 
Act: The Continuing Search for a National Standard, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1329, 1330 (1994).  
 199  Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act Summary, supra note 193.  
The UCCJA [did] not give first priority to the ‘home state’ of the child 
in determining which state may exercise jurisdiction over a child 
custody dispute.  The PKPA does.  The PKPA also provides that once a 
state has exercised jurisdiction, that jurisdiction remains the 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction until every party to the dispute has 
exited that state.  The UCCJA simply state[d] that a legitimate exercise 
of jurisdiction must be honored by any other state until the basis for 
that exercise of jurisdiction no longer exists. 
Id. 
 200  Id.  
 201  WADLINGTON & O’BRIEN, supra note 45, at 3.  
 202  A bill is pending in Massachusetts for the UCCJEA’s adoption.  JUDITH AREEN 
ET AL., supra note 46, at 1190; see also H. 31, 188th Leg. (Ma. 2013), available at 
https://malegislature.gov/Bills/188/House/H31.  
 203  See UCCJEA Adoptions, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://uniformlaws.org/Shared/docs/UCCJEAadoptions.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 
2014); see also UCCJEA Adoption Table, THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID A. BLUMBERG, 
http://www.uccjea.net/resources/adoptions.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).  
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B.  The Best Approach: The UDPCVA and Contingent Federal Funding 
Though the UDPCVA is substantively the best approach to 
provide greater protections for servicemember parents in custody 
proceedings,204 its effectiveness as a uniform law will be eclipsed if all 
states do not adopt it.  Only four states have enacted the UDPCVA 
since the ULC approved it in mid-2012.205  Therefore, Congress must 
establish a plan now to ensure that all states adopt the UDPCVA in a 
timely manner.  The states’ adoption of the UIFSA and the UCCJEA 
demonstrates that Congress can successfully use its Spending Power 
to achieve the states’ adoption of uniform laws.206  Accordingly, 
Congress should use its Spending Power in this instance, too.  One 
way Congress can validly do so is to make funding for welfare 
contingent on the states’ adoption of the UDPCVA.  Since its creation 
under the PRWORA in 1996, Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (“TANF”) has been a block grant program that provides 
states federal funds each year to develop and maintain their welfare 
programs.207  TANF provides billions of dollars to the states each 
year.208  Thus, if Congress were to condition the receipt of TANF 
funds on the states’ adoption of the UDPCVA, the states would surely 
and efficiently adopt the uniform law.209 
C. Possible Disadvantages of the Proposed Approach 
In advocating for this approach, it is necessary to address its few 
potential disadvantages.  From a critic’s perspective, the first concern 
may be that states will adopt the uniform law with variations.  The 
UCCJEA has been adopted in forty-nine states, for example, but the 
language of the states’ statutes varies.210  Nevertheless, this variation is 
arguably minor.  For instance, the ULC’s UCCJEA defines 
“commencement” of a child custody proceeding as “the filing of the 
 
 204  See supra Part V.B.  
 205  See supra notes 173–174 and accompanying text.   
 206  See supra Part VI.A.  
 207  Policy Basics: An Introduction to TANF, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 1, 
available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-22-10tanf2.pdf; see also About TANF, OFFICE 
OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/programs/tanf/about 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 208  See generally Policy Basics: An Introduction to TANF, supra note 207, at 2.  
 209  Notably, because an almost identical approach has been successfully 
implemented previously in the family law context, including with the UIFSA and the 
UCCJEA, it is highly unlikely that this would constitute unconstitutional “strong 
arming.”  See supra Part VI.A. 
 210  See Kevin Wessel, Home Is Where the Court Is: Determining Residence for Child 
Custody Matters Under the UCCJEA, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141, 1149 n.55 (2012). 
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first pleading in a proceeding.”211  By contrast, Wisconsin’s UCCJEA 
states that “commencement” means “the filing of the first pleading in 
a proceeding, provided that service is completed in accordance with 
the applicable provisions of ch. 801.”212  As such, it is arguable that 
Wisconsin’s definition of “commencement” is slightly more restrictive 
than the ULC’s definition, but this is a minor distinction.  Similarly, 
Mississippi’s UCCJEA exemplifies slight deviation from the ULC’s 
version.  The ULC’s UCCJEA establishes that exclusive jurisdiction 
can be lost in two ways, one of them being that “a court of this State 
or a court of another State determines that the child, the child’s 
parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in 
this State.”213  Mississippi’s exclusive jurisdiction section uses the term 
“currently do not reside.”214  It is unclear, however, that there is any 
significant difference between the language.  Overall, despite minor 
linguistic variations in the states’ versions, the UCCJEA still has been 
successful at achieving a high level of uniformity.215 
In the four states that have enacted the UDPCVA, each state’s 
statute does, in fact, contain some linguistic variation from the 
UDPCVA the ULC has proposed.216  North Dakota and North 
Carolina have notably eliminated the ULC’s UDPCVA Section 107, 
but the rest of each statute very closely mirrors the ULC’s UDPCVA.217  
The Nevada and Colorado laws also closely approximate the ULC’s 
UDPCVA, with only slight language variations.218  Even if the 
 
 211  UNIF. CHILD-CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 102 (1997), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/child_custody_jurisdiction
/uccjea_final_97.pdf. 
 212  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 822.02(5) (West 2013). 
 213  UNIF. CHILD-CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 202 (1997), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/child_custody_jurisdiction
/uccjea_final_97.pdf (emphasis added).  
 214  MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-27-202 (West 2013) (emphasis added); see also Wessel, 
supra note 210, at 1149 n.55. 
 215  See generally Acts: Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Child%20Custody%20Jurisdiction%20a
nd%20Enforcement%20Act (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 216  See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125C.010–125C.250 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 
14-13.7-101–504 (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-09.3-01–26 (West 2013); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50A-350–396 (West 2013); see also UNIF. DEPLOYED PARENTS 
CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT §§ 101–504 (2012), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Deployed_Parents/2012_DPCVA_Final.p
df. 
 217  See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-09.3-01–26 (West 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 50A-350–396 (West 2013).  
 218  See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125C.010–125C.250 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 
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remaining states adopt the UDPCVA with slight variations or changes 
in language as well, the UDPCVA’s mandated adoption in order to 
receive welfare funding will at least ensure that states that do not 
currently have any protections implement some.  Moreover, this 
proposed approach works to ensure the states’ adoption of the vast 
majority of the core precepts of the UDPCVA, and that in itself would 
contribute to greater uniformity among the states.219 
It is unlikely that Congress would ever condition federal funding 
on the states’ adoption of the exact language of the UDPCVA 
because of federalism concerns, mainly the still prevalent notion that 
family law should in some way be left to the states.220  Notably, critics 
may argue that a uniform law with a federal requirement that states 
adopt it or lose federal funding still poses federalism problems.  The 
notion that the states have the autonomy to make slight changes to 
the language of their adopted uniform acts, however, helps to dispel 
federalist critique but still preserves the needed level of uniformity.  
Additionally, the ULC’s member composition suggests that the states 
were represented in a meaningful way when the ULC drafted and 
approved the UDPCVA.  The ULC’s members include lawyers, 
judges, legislators, and law professors who have been appointed by 
state governments to research, draft, and promote enactment of 
uniform state laws.221  While some may argue that the states are 
similarly represented in Congress in debate over the SCRA, 
Congressman Turner’s bills consistently fail to garner Senate 
support.222  Therefore, the SCRA amendment lacks from state 
representatives what the UDPCVA has—sufficient approval. 
Another concern may be that a state could still refuse to adopt 
the UDPCVA, as Massachusetts has done in failing to adopt the 
UCCJEA.223  Although Massachusetts has not yet adopted the 
UCCJEA, a bill to enact it is currently pending in its Legislature.224  
 
14-13.7-101–504 (West 2014).   
 219  Admittedly, Section 107 is a core precept of the UDPCVA; the fact that North 
Dakota and North Carolina have not adopted this provision, however, is mitigated by 
the fact that these states have adopted the rest of the UDPCVA essentially word for 
word.  See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09.3-01–26 (West 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
50A-350–396 (West 2013). 
 220  See supra Part IV.C.  
 221  About the ULC, supra note 25.  
 222  See supra note 138 and accompanying text.  
 223  See JUDITH AREEN ET AL., supra note 46, at 1190; see also Julie A. Morley, Note, A 
Silver Lining in Domestic Turmoil: A Call for Massachusetts to Adopt the UCCJEA’s Emergency 
Jurisdiction Provision, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 135 (2008). 
 224  H. 31, 188th Leg. (Ma. 2013), available at 
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Additionally, a similar scenario with the UDPCVA, though admittedly 
possible, is unlikely given the financial and social consequences a 
state would face if it failed to adopt the UDPCVA.225  The withholding 
of welfare funds that would result if a state did not adopt the 
UDPCVA is severe enough that most, if not all, states would buckle to 
the Congressional demand. 
In sum, making funding for welfare contingent on states’ 
adoption of the UDPCVA would not be a brand new approach to 
uniform laws within the family law realm.  Instead, it would be an 
appropriate approach given the success and ubiquity of other 
uniform laws pertaining to family law through the same type of 
Congressional encouragement. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
With a large number of single parents serving in the military226 
and increased deployments in the past several years,227 an abundance 
of reports have surfaced that many military servicemembers face 
battles overseas and return home to a battle for custody of their 
children.228  A servicemember may make temporary custody 
arrangements for his or her child, sometimes with the non-
servicemember parent, through a non-binding Family Care Plan only 
to return from deployment to find that the non-servicemember 
parent will not relinquish custody.  Alternatively, a non-
servicemember parent may gain custody through a temporary order 
while a servicemember is deployed, despite the SCRA’s mandated 
stays, with the result that the temporary order becomes permanent 
upon the servicemember parent’s return home.  Also, there remains 
the possibility that in some jurisdictions “deployment” itself or the 
 
http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/188/House/H31.  
 225  It is unclear what the consequences have been to Massachusetts for failing to 
enact the UCCJEA thus far.  There have been attempts in Massachusetts to pass the 
UCCJEA since around 2001, which perhaps suggests that the federal government 
may have held off on funding consequences to Massachusetts due to the state’s 
seeming proactivity in this area.  See generally Fern L. Frolin, Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Enforcement Act: A Better Child Custody Jurisdiction Law for Massachusetts, 6 
SECTION REVIEW 1, 17–19 (2004), https://www.massbar.org/publications/section-
review/2004/v6-n3; see also S. 872, 183rd Leg. (Ma. 2005), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/legis/184history/s00872.htm; see also H. 1657, 185th Leg. (Ma. 
2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/185/ht01pdf
/ht01657.pdf.  
 226  See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
 227  See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
 228  See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
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“potential for future deployment” will be used in the court’s best 
interests determination. 
Some have argued that the legal landscape for military 
servicemembers facing child custody issues “could potentially impact 
the welfare of military children and the ability of servicemembers to 
effectively serve their country.”229  Other concerns in the media and 
elsewhere, however, are perhaps fueled by the inherent injustice the 
current legal system poses to military servicemembers.  The possibility 
that military servicemembers could lose custody of their children 
simply for doing their job, a job necessary for the protection of the 
United States, provides a compelling explanation for why change in 
this particular area of family law is so needed. 
In recent years, some states have taken steps to implement laws 
that provide greater protection for servicemembers in the context of 
child custody disputes.  These laws are varied though, and in some 
states they do not exist at all.  There are also serious inadequacies in 
the current SCRA.  There have been multiple attempts at passage of 
an amendment to the SCRA, but the lack of support in the Senate 
and criticism from other fronts indicate that a strictly federal 
approach is not likely to succeed.  In the face of this void, the ULC 
has proposed the UDPCVA, which aims to standardize custody rights 
for military parents in child custody cases.  Though the UDPCVA is 
not guaranteed to assist every military servicemember fighting for his 
or her custodial rights, it strikes a balance that moves toward a much 
more consistent application of law in the country that these military 
servicemembers bravely serve.  Additionally, the UDPCVA will largely 
avoid the problems posed by SCRA amendment, including critic’s 
concerns grounded in federalism. 
State legislatures are not required to adopt uniform law 
proposals.  Nevertheless, the states undoubtedly will adopt the 
UDPCVA if the receipt of welfare funds is made contingent on its 
adoption by the states.  As a result, the problem that the ULC seeks to 
address—a lack of uniformity among the states—could be 
ameliorated with the strategic encouragement of the federal 
government. 
 
 229  BURRELLI & MILLER, supra note 79, at 2.  
